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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems
(SCADA) are widely used to control critical infrastructure
automatically. Capturing and analyzing packet-level traf-
fic flowing through such a network is an essential require-
ment for problems such as legacy network mapping and
fault detection. Within the framework of captured network
traffic, we present a simple modeling technique, which
supports the mapping of the SCADA network topology
via traffic monitoring. By characterizing atomic network
components in terms of their input-output topology and
the relationship between their data traffic logs, we show
that these modeling primitives have good compositional
behaviour, which allows complex networks to be modeled.
Finally, the predictions generated by our model are found
to be in good agreement with experimentally obtained traf-
fic.
Keywords: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) Topology, Network mapping, Modeling, Net-
work traffic analysis
1 Introduction
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems are used in industrial environments to manage and
control critical infrastructure such as transport systems,
telecommunications, power and energy services. These
systems were invented to handle communication over a
large geographical distance and multiple sites. Previously,
they were designed to operate in an isolated environment
using proprietary protocols which ensured some level of
security by obscurity. However, in recent years, these sys-
tems have evolved from being stand-alone networks and
are now interconnected with both enterprise networks and
the Internet with the use of Transmission Control Proto-
cols (TCP)/Internet Control Protocol (IP) leading to wider
networks. Though this has led to easy manageability, and
improvements in functionality and productivity, connect-
ing SCADA networks to the Internet and corporate net-
works exposes the systems to attacks with possible ruinous
effects.
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SCADA networks have some distinct behaviours when
compared to “traditional” Information Technology (IT)
networks. SCADA networks are expected to be more sta-
ble over time with fewer or no devices added to or fre-
quently leaving the network; and in contrast to a traditional
network, SCADA networks support fewer services (Bar-
bosa et al. 2012b). SCADA network has a well-defined
structure with a predictable traffic behavour as a result of
its fixed number of network devices, regular network com-
munication patterns and limited number of protocols (Bar-
bosa & Pras 2010).
However, increased connectivity between SCADA and
other networks can lead to instability in SCADA network
communication behaviour. Nicholson et al. (2012) argued
that the main cause of security vulnerabilities in SCADA
systems seems to be the increased connectivity and the loss
of separation between SCADA and other parts of organi-
zations’ IT infrastructures. It is crucial to have up-to-date
knowledge of the communications topology of SCADA
networks to ensure stability of the network. This can be
achieved via network mapping.
Network mapping is the study of network connectiv-
ity. This is very useful to industries with a large dispersed
network. Several published works (Besaw et al. 1994, Bre-
itbart et al. 2000, Govindan & Tangmunarunkit 2000) have
shown the use of network mapping in the study of Internet
structure, detecting shared bottlenecks and detecting net-
work intrusions using various techniques including devel-
opment of algorithms for discovering the network topol-
ogy (Breitbart et al. 2000) and use of statistical analysis of
network packet characteristics (Bykova et al. 2001). How-
ever, this previous research is limited to standard IT infras-
tructure.
The contribution of our work is a new modeling tech-
nique to detect whether or not a SCADA network’s traffic
is consistent with its anticipated topology. This aids in
checking network misconfiguration, legacy network map-
ping, maintenance of growing/evolving networks, moni-
toring for system failure and monitoring for intrusions.
In this paper, we demonstrate a modeling process to as-
sist SCADA network mapping via network traffic analysis.
Our topological modeling technique defines network mod-
eling primitives which can be combined to create complete
network traffic flow models. This technique can be used
to confirm whether or not a network topology has been
changed. This work investigates top-down data flow in
SCADA networks and we explore a set-theory approach
to developing the logical relationships needed to describe
the data flow in a network. We exploit the rigid hierar-
chical structure of SCADA systems to produce a simple
modeling approach. This is as a result of fixed number of
network devices, regular network communication patterns
and a limited number of protocols (Barbosa & Pras 2010)
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 in-
troduces the work and its motivation. Section 2 examines
related work on network traffic flow, network discovery
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and SCADA traffic monitoring. In Section 3, we describe
our network modeling primitives used for modeling and
mapping network topologies and we give descriptions of
the compositional behavior of the modeling primitives and
how these primitives are connected to form topologies.
Practical case studies are presented in Section 4 and Sec-
tion 5 provides the discussion. Finally, the conclusion is
discussed in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Studying the structure and characteristics of large net-
works, especially the Internet, has drawn the attention of
many researchers. Though there are challenges in moni-
toring network traffic, Lakhina et al. (2004) explained that
one way of addressing this problem is by recognizing that
observed traffic on different links of a network is not inde-
pendent. This paper stated that a direct and fundamental
way of studying network traffic is by analyzing the net-
work’s set of Origin-Destination flows which indicates all
traffic entering at a specific point and exiting the network
at some other points. This concept is a starting point for
our work in network traffic analysis.
Bykova et al. (2001) described how statistical analysis
of network packet characteristics can be used in detecting
network intrusions. This paper tried to identify how much
information can be deduced about an attack by checking
the packet headers but not their contents. The paper did not
address how to detect inconsistencies in a network topol-
ogy as a result of configuration errors, routing error or im-
proper documentation. By contrast, our approach can de-
tect such inconsistencies in a network topology.
In a related work, Barbosa et al. (2012a) provided
a view into the characteristics of SCADA network traf-
fic. This paper showed the similarity between SCADA
traffic and Simple Network Messaging Protocol (SNMP)
traffic as a regular time series which “presents baseline
changes at seemingly arbitrary time intervals” (Barbosa
et al. 2012a) because the majority of the sources generate
data in a periodical fashion.
In another work by Barbosa et al. (2012b), they ver-
ified whether or not the models used in describing tradi-
tional network traffic can be used in SCADA traffic. The
research was based on a list of network traffic invariants
such as diurnal patterns of patterns, self-similarity, long-
normal connection sizes and heavy-tail distributions. They
compared characteristics of SCADA traffic traces analysis
with traditional network traffic and they concluded that the
existing traffic models can not be easily applied to SCADA
traffic.
SCADA networks were designed to be reliable and
fail-safe, but attacks or security breaches over the past
decade indicate that risks of deliberate attacks on the
systems have not been adequately considered (Nicholson
et al. 2012). There are numerous sources of threats to
SCADA such as human errors, equipment failures, natu-
ral disasters, terrorist groups, hostile governments and in-
dustrial spies. Most of the attacks on these systems re-
quire studying and identifying vulnerabilities in the net-
work topology which can be detected by monitoring the
network topology. Monitoring a network, especially a time
critical network such as a SCADA network, is a difficult
and a demanding task. It has been a difficult objective to
perform whole network traffic analysis, that is, monitoring
every point in the network and modeling it.
To detect any deviation from the intended or expected
communications topology of a SCADA system, which
may indicate that the system has been compromised, net-
work traffic analysis is required to study the “normal” data
flow and generate a model topology, thus necessitating a
modeling process. In our research, we show how to model
Figure 1: A simplified SCADA System Architecture
SCADA network components and compose these primi-
ties to predict expected traffic patterns.
3 SCADA Network Modeling and Mapping
SCADA networks consist of components such as Hu-
man Machine Interfaces (HMI), Remote Telemetry Units
(RTU), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) and other
devices (see Figure 1), connected hierarchically (in a tree-
like structure) to achieve scalability. Data communications
in SCADA systems are based on a master/slave (server-
client) architecture (Igure et al. 2006, Daneels & Salter
1999). A SCADA control unit/master station commu-
nicates with field devices via communication channels
such as fiber networks, public switch telephone networks
(PSTNs), satellite links and even Ethernet. The control
unit transmits SCADA messages to the field sites using
SCADA protocols, but the field sites do not interact di-
rectly with each other. These features distinguish SCADA
systems from general-purpose IT systems.
Observing network traffic assists in learning about a
network topology and its behaviour. Our modeling and
mapping approach for SCADA network topology discov-
ery begins by modeling primitive components and com-
bining them to predict what traffic should pass each point
in the network. The run time analysis process then en-
tails matching captured packets at both ends of a network
connection to compare with the model to detect inconsis-
tencies.
In this paper, we study the network traffic behaviour as-
suming perfect communications in the network, however,
future work will be the application of the traffic modeling
process described in this paper to lossy communications
as well as considering SCADA network analysis in real
time. Our models focus on the communication path from
the HMI to the PLC/RTU.
3.1 Modeling technique
We developed our modeling technique using set-
theoretical relations to express the expected network be-
haviour as deduced from the physical topology. This sec-
tion presents the various modeling primitives and shows
their compositional behaviour.
3.1.1 Modeling Primitives
We model network components in terms of their input-
output traffic flow by expressing the expected relationship
between the set of packets entering the device and those
CRPIT Volume 159 - Computer Science 2015
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Figure 2: Atomic components for SCADA network modeling
exiting it. Figure 2 describes the various atomic compo-
nents.
For this purpose, we do not need to consider the full
behaviour of networking devices (such as switches, hubs
and routers). We can also ignore details such as the various
protocols used in a SCADA network.
3.1.2 Atomic Components Behavior
The behavior of atomic components expresses the ex-
pected data flow through them and can be illustrated us-
ing set-theoretical relationships between various interfaces
where network traffic could potentially be monitored. In
Figure 2, letters A, B, C, etc represent the set of all packets
passing a particular point in the network. The behaviours
for various components are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Buffer/Forward) This is a component with
input equal to its output as shown in the pattern labeled
B in Figure 2. Messages are transferred from the input
interface to the output interface without any alteration or
changes, so the set of entries at A is equal to the set of
entries at interface B. This expresses the behavior of net-
working devices such as simple repeaters and it can be
defined by:
A = B (1)
Definition 2 (Broadcaster) This is a component with one
input and multiple identical output interfaces as shown by
the pattern labeled R in Figure 2. A broadcaster receives
messages and the messages are repeated at all the output
interfaces. This is defined by:
A = B = C (2)
Definition 3 (Switch) This is a component having one in-
put and multiple output interfaces where a choice is being
made between the outputs as shown by the pattern labeled
S in Figure 2. When a host sends packets through the de-
vice, the packets received at B and C are not the same.
This is as a result of switching according to the addressed
destination (but the switching rules are not modeled here).
This is defined by:
A = B ∪ C (3)
B ∩ C = ∅ (4)
Definition 4 (Filter) This is a component in which mes-
sages from the input interface are filtered depending on
configuration-specific rules as shown by the pattern la-
beled F in Figure 2. The filtering is defined based on
user-defined policies (although these do not form part of
our model). Security networking devices such as firewalls
and intrusion prevention systems demonstrate this kind of
behaviour. This is defined by:
A ⊇ B (5)
Definition 5 (Merger) This is a component with multiple
inputs and one output as shown by the pattern labeled M
in Figure 2. Messages from multiple inputs are combined
and sent to another interface as an output. This is defined
by:
A ∪B = C (6)
A ∩B = ∅ (7)
The log of packets captured at any interface is regarded
as the elements of the interface. A set is defined as a col-
lection of unique objects, hence, every packet observed at
each interface must be uniquely identifiable.
3.1.3 Primitives Interconnectivity
The atomic components above are used to express the ex-
pected behavior of a network. This requires that some of
these atomic components can be linked together to form a
network topology. For instance, a filter component can be
combined with a buffer and their respective input-output
relationships can be merged to create a new compound net-
work component. To achieve this, the steps are:
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• Step 1: Connection of required components
This first step entails linking required components to-
gether by joining their “connectors”. Connectors are
represented with a dot (•) in Figure 2 and they are
the observation points where packets are assumed to
be captured. Figure 3 shows how two components,
a switch and a buffer, are connected by joining their
connectors to form a simple network topology.
Figure 3: Interconnectivity of atomic components
• Step 2: Unification of the set variables
This step requires unifying the set variables of the two
connected components. It is important to rename the
set variables in the set equations to eliminate ambi-
guities. The diagram in Figure 4 shows how the vari-
ables are renamed and unified in this case.
Figure 4: Unification of set variables and renaming
• Step 3: Simplification of resulting set equations
This last step involves simplifying the resulting set
of equations to identify the relationships between the
intended “observation points” in the network. Of-
ten this will show only end-to-end input and output
points, but sometimes we will also allow for the pos-
sibility of adding a “tap” in the middle. An exam-
ple of inferring the combined behaviour from the two
component patterns is shown below in relation to Fig-
ure 4.
Pattern 1:
A = B ∪ C (8)
B ∩ C = ∅ (9)
Pattern 2:
B = D (10)
Summary:
A = D ∪ C (11)
D ∩ C = ∅ (12)
The set-theoretical relationships can be derived from
the physical topology of the network and possibly other
network documentation that reflect all necessary compo-
nents in the network. The result describes the expected
communications pattern of the network which will assist
in network mapping and to verify if the actual network
traffic behaviour is consistent with the assumed topology.
3.2 Network Analysis Process
Our SCADA Network Analysis process can be divided
into four main procedures. The first procedure starts
with developing a set of component models as described
in Section 3.1.3 from physical topology diagrams and/or
network documentation of the network to create the de-
sign model which expresses the expected communication
topology.
The second procedure is capturing network packets
from various points in the network. Network traffic is
monitored at several possible points.
The third procedure is the analysis to see if the ob-
served traffic matches that predicted by the design model.
This process includes comparing the captured packets at
the input interface with the captured packets at the output
interfaces. However, a unique packet identifier is required
to uniquely match captured packets between the sender
and various destinations. This could be one or a combi-
nation of fields in the packet. An Internet Protocol (IP)
datagram consists of a packet header and data. The packet
header contains fields such as source IP addresses, desti-
nation IP addresses, protocol, identification, Type of Ser-
vice, header length, header checksum, time to live, among
others used in routing, fragmentation and defragmentation
of packets. In a network, each IP datagram is assigned
a unique value in the identification field of every packet
and all fragments of the datagram have the same identifi-
cation number. The identification field has 16 bits which
get reused. Thus, to uniquely identify a packet in a large
capture, more fields of the packet header will be required.
For this paper, the combination of source IP address, des-
tination IP address and packet IP identification numbers is
used as the unique packet identifier.
Having identified the packets, the next procedure is to
compare the result against the packet set relationships in
the derived model to verify whether or not the network
traffic behaviour is consistent with the anticipated traffic
behaviour. The derived logic expresses the expected com-
munications behaviour of the network and any deviation
from it proves that the network has been compromised.
4 Experimental Set-up
As a proof of concept, two experiments were conducted,
a simple network using a SCADA testbed (simulating a
water treatment and distribution system) and a more com-
plex network in a simulated environment using a graphical
network simulator (GNS3). Under each experiment, two
tests were conducted and the following are the assump-
tions made:
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• no loss of packets;
• data flow from top-down, that is from the HMI to the
physical devices via PLCs;
• all packets are uniquely identifiable; and
• network traffic can potentially be monitored at every
possible point in the network.
The first test for each experiment is to show how the
model can be used to confirm that the network is consis-
tent with the anticipated topology as stated in the network
documentation while the other test shows how the model
can be used to detect a change in the network.
This section describes the experimental set-up and the
application of the network modeling and mapping tech-
niques as stated in this paper.
4.1 Experiment 1
The first experimental set-up consists of two machines
(a Controller and an attacker) and two PLCs. The con-
troller provides both the HMI and Master Telemetry Units
(MTU) functionality implemented using a LabView ap-
plication while the attacker runs a Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) Modicon Communication Bus (Modbus)
hacker program. The network includes a conventional Eth-
ernet network as the data communications network and
Modbus/TCP was utilized as the SCADA protocol. The
target PLCs using a National Instruments Compact RIO
provide the remote terminal unit (RTU). The controller
communicates with the PLCs using a master/slave tech-
nique which is the architecture Modbus/TCP is based on.
Each PLC controls a process setup shown in Figure 5
which comprises a water tank controller as may be found
in a chemical plant. For this experiment, two tests were
conducted; the first under a perfect environment while the
other was in a compromised condition, to generate normal
and attack traffic.
Figure 5: Process and Instrumentation Diagram
4.1.1 Methodology
Each test was conducted over a period of 180 seconds. The
controller and attacker sent messages to the PLCs control-
ling the water pump and packets were generated.
For the first test, the controller attempted to turn the
pump on and off at 30 second intervals while the attacker
remained dormant. Figure 6 depicts the physical topology
of the network and also shown in Figure 7 is a network pat-
tern showing the expected communications topology con-
structed using our primitives.
Adopting the steps described in Section 3.1.3, a model
for the network was derived using the physical topology
to confirm if the predicted packet relationships conform
Figure 6: Setup for Experiment 1
Figure 7: Network pattern for the normal topology in Ex-
periment 1
to the traffic pattern generated from the captured pack-
ets. Below is the formulated relationships derived from
this model:
A = B ∪ C
B ∩ C = ∅
B = D
C = E
The above equations can further be simplified as follows:
A = D ∪ E
D ∩ E = ∅
After developing the relationships representing the ex-
pected communication topology, we then tapped the net-
work to observe traffic and captured network packets at
points A, D and E using the Wireshark application. Shown
in Figure 8 is a sample of captured packets at input inter-
face A between the HMI.
The next step taken was the analysis of network pack-
ets. The captured packets were analyzed using the follow-
ing steps:
• Extraction of required fields from the captured net-
work packets such as source IP address, destination
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Figure 8: Packets captured using Wireshark in Experiment 1
IP address and identification number. This forms the
unique packet identifier to be used in matching pack-
ets between the sender and receivers;
• Packets captured at the sender interface were matched
with the captured packets at the receivers’ (PLC 1 and
PLC 2) interfaces. The result represented the number
of matched and unmatched packets.
A sample of a packet analyzed showing the source IP
address, destination IP address and the identification num-
ber is shown in Figure 9.
The second test was conducted with the presence of an
attacker. The attacker attempted to disrupt the control of
the pump by using the TCP Modbus Hacker program. For
the second test, the Attacker lays dormant in the time pe-
riod up to 60 seconds and in the time period of 61-90 sec-
onds, the Attacker floods PLC 1 by performing the oppo-
site actions of the Controller in the same period. This test
was performed to show how our model can be used to de-
tect deviations from the intended communications topol-
ogy in the SCADA network. All generated traffic for the
two environments were captured and then analyzed. The
following section presents the obtained results and analy-
sis.
4.1.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
In the two tests conducted, the captured packets at the
controller interface were uniquely matched with the ones
at each of the PLCs’ interfaces using the chosen unique
packet identifier and two tables were generated from the
analysis. Table 1 shows the analysis of network packets
captured under perfect conditions while Table 2 records
the analysis of the network with the presence of an at-
tacker.
Table 1: Results under normal conditions for Experiment 1
Interface No of matched packets No of unmatched packets
A 40620 Nil
A and D 20311 Nil
A and E 20309 Nil
The result of the first test as shown in Table 1 indicates
the number of packets sent as messages from the controller
via interface A to each of the PLCs, observed at each of the
Table 2: Results under an unsecured environment for Ex-
periment 2
Interface No of matched packets No of unmatched packets
A 40620 nil
A and D 16934 10054
A and E 20308 nil
interfaces D and E. The result was compared to the packet
relationships formulated from the physical topology of the
network using our modeling primitives. According to the
model, the log of entries at point A must be the union of
entries observed at points B and C. In Table 1, all packets
matched, so the topology is consistent with the expected
behavior of the network.
On the other hand, the result of the second test as
shown in Table 2 indicates that not all packets sent from
the controller and observed at point A matched the cap-
tured packets observed at point E of PLC1. This suggests
that the network traffic is not consistent with the antici-
pated network communications.
For further analysis, we generated a traffic model from
the network for each test. This is done by matching the
log of packets from the input interface with its output in-
terface(s) using the unique packet identifier, as shown Fig-
ure 7, packets at point A are matched against output pack-
ets at points B and C, while D and E are the output of B
and C respectively.
The created traffic models are compared to the design
model generated from the physical topology and Table 3
presents the comparison.
Table 3: Comparison between original model and traffic
models for Experiment 1
Design Model Traffic Model
Test 1 Test 2
A = B ∪ C A = B ∪ C A 6= B ∪ C
B = D B = D B = D
C = E C = E C = E
A = D ∪ E A = D ∪ E A 6= D ∪ E
D ∩ E = ∅ D ∩ E = ∅ D ∩ E = ∅
These results indicate that the state of the network does
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Figure 9: Analysis of a network packet from Experiment 1
not conform to the anticipated behaviour and the implica-
tions are as follows:
• This suggests that there are deviations from the in-
tended communications topology, which means that
the original network topology has been compro-
mised.
• It also indicates that there might be an intrusion, error
in routing or configuration error.
Section 5 discusses further the analysis of this experiment.
4.2 Experiment 2
In this second experiment, a more complex topology was
designed in a simulated environment using a graphical net-
work simulator (GNS3). The experimental set-up con-
sisted of a router with firewall, switches, hubs and six
workstations, and two tests were conducted. The network
was divided into two network domains with two worksta-
tions (I and II) controlling each domain. Assigned to do-
main 1 were workstations I, III and IV while workstations
II, V and VI formed the domain 2. The physical topology
of the network is shown in Figure 10.
4.2.1 Methodology
Two tests were conducted and for the first test, the network
was set up as shown in Figure 10 while for the second
test, the network set-up was altered. The aim was to detect
whether or not the alteration could be detected using our
network modeling and mapping approach.
For clarity, the entire network is divided into four do-
mains as indicated in Figure 10 and shown in Figure 11 is
the model developed using our primitive components.
Traffic relationships were derived from the model of
the network as shown below.
Group 1:
A ∪B = C
A ∩B = ∅
Group 2:
C ⊇ D
Group 3:
D = E ∪ F
E ∩ F = ∅
Figure 11: Model of the network in Figure 10
Groups 4 and 5:
E = G ∪H
G ∩H = ∅
F = I ∪ J
I ∩ J = ∅
For this experiment, a firewall was configured on the
router to filter outgoing packets from the sender and this
implies that packets are checked to confirm if they con-
form to the set policy which states that any packets outside
the specified network addresses should be dropped. There-
fore, in a lossless communication environment, no packet
is expected to be dropped, i.e.
C = D
To simplify the resulting set equations:
A ∪B = G ∪H ∪ I ∪ J
A ∩B = ∅
In addition, based on our knowledge of the way the
generated packets are addressed and the switches are set
in this network configuration, we further introduce more
specific constraints for this particular set up:
A = G ∪H
B = I ∪ J
Following the derivation of the network logic is net-
work capturing. Network packets were captured at vari-
ous input and output points; A, B, G, H, I and J, using the
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Figure 10: Network Topology for Experiment 2
Wireshark application. In GNS3, network interfaces can
be tapped to monitor network traffic. 200 packets were
sent simultaneously from the workstations (I and II) in
group 1 as shown in Figure 10 to other workstations within
their assigned domain.
For the second test, the switch connecting workstations
V and VI was replaced with a hub. This was to investigate
the impact of a change in a device on network communi-
cations.
The captured packets were analyzed by matching the
entries at both inputs with the entries at the outputs. Pre-
sented in the following section is the experimental result
and analyis.
4.2.2 Experimental Result and Analysis
For the first test, network traffic was observed at inter-
faces A, B, G, I, H and J, and a unique packet identifier
which is the combination of the source IP address, des-
tination IP address and identification number, was used
to match packets between the senders and the receivers.
Packets sent from workstation I as observed at point A
were matched against captured packets at points G and
H, and likewise entries at point B sent from workstation
II were matched against entries at points I and J. Tables 4
and 5 reveal the results of the matched packets for both
domains.
Table 4: Experiment 2, the analysis of domain1 for test 1
Interface No of matched packets
A 200
A and G 100
A and H 100
In the second test conducted, an increased number of
packets were observed at points A, I and J when compared
with the observed packets at points B, G and H. Table 6
shows the comparison between the observed packets at
Table 5: Experiment 2, the analysis of domain 2 for test 1
Interface No of matched packets
B 200
B and I 100
B and J 100
points A and B. Also observed at point B, I and J were
the same number of packets as shown in Table 7.
Table 6: Experiment 2, the analysis of domain 1 for test 2
Interface No of packets
A 200
B 205
Table 7: Experiment 2, the analysis of domain 2 for test 2
Interface No of packets
B 205
I 205
J 205
Tables 4 and 5 reveal the result of the first test show-
ing that the number of packets detected at the senders’
interfaces are equal to the sum of the number of packets
detected at the receivers’ end of the connection and ac-
cords with the network configuration which was derived,
A = G ∪H and B = I ∪ J . The network traffic analysis
thus shows that the network behaviour is consistent with
the anticipated topology as stated in the physical topology
of the network.
For each test conducted in this experiment, a traffic
model was also generated by matching each packet cap-
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tured at the input point(s) against its output point(s). As
shown in Figure 6, packets at points A and B are matched
against packets at point C, and likewise other points. The
created traffic models are compared to the design model
generated from the physical topology and depicted in Ta-
ble 8 is the comparison of the models.
Table 8: Comparison between original model and traffic
models for Experiment 2
Design Model Traffic Model
Test 1 Test 2
A ∪B = C A ∪B = C A ∪B = C
A ∩B = ∅ A ∩B = ∅ A ∩B = ∅
C = D C = D C = D
D = E ∪ F D = E ∪ F D = E ∪ F
E ∩ F = ∅ E ∩ F = ∅ E ∩ F = ∅
E = G ∪H E = G ∪H E = G ∪H
F = I ∪ J F = I ∪ J F = I = J
As shown by the final row, the change of device is re-
vealed by the change in the observed traffic.
5 Discussion
The two experiments shown in this paper have demon-
strated how network traffic analysis can be used to iden-
tify whether network flow is consistent with the expected
topology. In each experiment, two tests were performed to
check how set theoretical component models can be used
to depict data flow in a network and also used in develop-
ing a model topology.
In Experiment 1, the result of the first test confirmed
the consistency of in the network’s behaviour when com-
pared with the expected communications topology ex-
pressed using our model derived from the network physi-
cal topology, while on the other hand, the second test re-
vealed the inconsistency.
The result of the second test of Experiment 1 indicated
that the set of the received packets at both output points
D and E was not equal to the observed packets at the in-
put point, that is, A 6= D ∪ E which is contrary to the
relationship formally derived from the physical topology,
A = D ∪ E. This was because not all packets sent from
the HMI were observed at PLC 2 while all the packets
sent from the same HMI to PLC 1 got to their destination.
In order to detect where the changes occurred, network
traffic was observed at every point on the network. Af-
ter monitoring point C, analysis detected the presence of
an unknown source (an attacker) connected to the network
and overriding the operations of the HMI (as shown in the
model in Figure 12 where F represents the attacker). While
matching the packets from the input (A) to the output (E)
using the unique packet identifier, there were some un-
matched packets which came from an unidentified source
IP address.
In Experiment 2, the result of the first test confirmed
that the network behaviour was consistent with the antici-
pated topology. According to the derived relationships for
the network, the captured packets at the input points (A
and B) must be the union of the packets captured at the
output points (G, H, I and J) and the result showed that
this was true.
However, the result obtained from the second test was
not consistent with the anticipated behaviour. The test re-
vealed a change in the expected communications topology.
200 packets were sent from workstations I and II each but
the observed traffic at point B indicated extra packets. Fur-
ther analysis showed that the captured packets at point I
and J were the same, that is, I = J , which is contrary to
Figure 12: Network model for the compromised topology
for test 2 of Experiment 1
the derived logic, I ∩J = ∅. Further investigation showed
that the changes observed in the network were as a result
of the change in a network device. Every point in the net-
work was observed and analyzed to identify the cause of
the change in the network’s traffic behaviour. The analysis
discovered a behavioural change as a result of the removal
of the switch connecting workstation V and VI which was
replaced with a hub, this led to an increase in the number
of packets observed at the interfaces. A hub broadcasts
messages and this explains why common traffic was ob-
served at points B, I and J.
We noted that our approach serves as an essential basis
for SCADA network topology analysis. Even though us-
ing our modeling and mapping process as described in this
paper assisted in identifying the consistency of an antici-
pated network communications topology with the network
traffic, there is more that could be achieved using this ap-
proach. The following work is to be investigated in future
using our modeling and mapping process:
• SCADA network topology discovery. Listening at
every point on a network could assist in generating
a complete topology of the network but this is im-
practicable in a real network. Therefore, to monitor a
SCADA system and develop a complete topology of
the system creates a problem: What point(s) on the
network need to be observed to generate a topology
of the network without monitoring every point?
• Lossy communication analysis. In SCADA network
monitoring, lossy network communication cannot be
disregarded. In this paper, we considered perfect
communication with some assumptions but for lossy
communications, the assumptions will be weakened
to allow for packet loss.
• Automated Analysis. In this paper, we performed
our analysis manually, however, this might not scale
properly in a network with thousands of components.
In our future work, we will consider using an auto-
mated process in solving scalability issue while still
using the same methodology.
• Real-time network analysis. Our future work will in-
vestigate how our modeling techniques could be ap-
plied in analyzing a SCADA network in real time
where complete logs of network traffic are not avail-
able. This requires the development of an auto-
modeling approach for analyzing “recent” network
traffic.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented simple models to describe
data flow through a SCADA network topology based on
the captured network traffic. This approach can be used
in SCADA network mapping due to its simple and pre-
dictable traffic behaviour. We considered various network
primitives as well as the underlying input-output relation-
ships needed for modeling a SCADA network. This work
has shown how such relationships can be developed by
studying the physical topology of a network and can then
be used in detecting deviations in a network’s communica-
tions from the intended communications topology, indica-
tive of intrusions or system failures.
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